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SENSE AND NONSENSE ABOUT CUSTOMARY




D ROFESSORS Bradley and Goldsmith have their finger on a sore
spot in U.S. human rights law, the charge of judicial activism lev-
ied against judicial enforcement of customary international law.' The
spot is sore because it has been chafed before, by Judge Robert Bork
and Professors Phillip Trimble and A.M. Weisburd, among others.2
Bradley and Goldsmith have more in mind than those criticisms, but
much of what they add is seriously in error and is embedded in a bi-
zarre conspiracy theory.3 This Response will regrettably have to en-
gage with this aspect of their argument before it can address the
eternal debate over judicial activism.
Bradley and Goldsmith's argument is contained in two articles, the
previously published Customary International Law: A Critique of the
Modern Position (hereinafter B&GI) and their summary and supple-
mentation of it for this symposium, The Current Illegitimacy of
Human Rights Litigation (hereinafter B&GII). B&GI takes the form
of an attack on what it calls "the modern position"' on customary in-
ternational law in the United States,5 the established doctrine that
customary international law norms are incorporated into the U.S.
* Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
1. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customar, International Law' as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, i10 Harv. L Rev. 815
(1997) [hereinafter B&GI]; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Ille-
gitimacy of International Human Rights Litigation. 66 Fordham L Rev. 319 (1997)
[hereinafter B&GII.
2. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 798-823 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork. J., concurring); Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist iew of Customary Interna-
tional Law, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 665 (1986): A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal
Courts, and International Cases, 20 Yale J. Int'l L. 1 (1995); Arthur M. Weisburd, Tie
Executive Branch and International Law, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 1205 (1988).
3. See B&GI, supra note 1. at 834-37 & n.128, 873-76 & n.365.
4. Id. at 816-17. The authors note that they "use the term 'position' to signify
that there is substantial agreement that [customary international law] has the status of
federal common law, not to signify that all those who adopt this position are in agree-
ment regarding its rationales or implications." Id. at 816 n.2.
5. As B&GI observes, customary international law is law of the international
community of states that arises "from a general and consistent practice of states fol-
lowed by them from a sense of legal obligation." B&GI, supra note 1, at 817-18 (quot-
ing American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States § 102(2) (1987) [hereinafter Restatement (Third)]). Aside from cus-
tomary international law, international law also includes international agreements
and legal rules derived from general principles common to the major legal systems of
the world. Restatement (Third). supra, § 102(1).
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legal system as a form of federal law.6 B&GI offers in place of this
established doctrine the claim that, in the absence of federal statute or
treaty, customary international law is at most State common law.7
Although B&GI attacks the modern position wholesale, its main
quarrel is with human rights enforcement. Several of its arguments
rely specifically on the features of human rights law, or what it calls
"the new CIL" ("CIL" being their abbreviation for customary interna-
tional law). As a result, the analysis neglects the effect of denying
federal character to the "old" customary international law, which ad-
dresses the rights of states against each other and, to some degree, the
treatment of foreign nationals. And because the major focus of the
analysis is judicial constraint of State legislatures, the analysis over-
looks the need to provide rules of decision for lower-level executive
officials and judges.
This short Response is inevitably selective. Parts I and II will dis-
cuss B&GI and two major errors in its argument. Part III will address
whether, as B&GI maintains, the freedom of State legislatures to vio-
late international human rights norms is required by U.S. traditions of
democracy. Finally, part IV will reconsider three issues clarified or
modified by B&GIL
I. THE "CAUTIONARY LESSON"
B&GI presents a two-pronged assault on the incorporation of cus-
tomary international law as federal law. First, the article seeks to
delegitimate the "modern position" (a nonstandard shorthand that I
will also employ for brevity) by attacking the process by which it
gained consensus support, finally resulting in its inclusion by the
American Law Institute in Section 111 of the Restatement (Third) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. Second, the article
focuses on some of the real and supposed consequences of the modern
6. The Restatement (Third) describes customary international law, as incorpo-
rated in the U.S. legal system, as "federal law." Restatement (Third), supra note 5,
§ 111 cmt. d. This usage is consistent with both the thesis that customary international
law is incorporated as federal common law and with alternative theses about the sta-
tus of customary international law within federal law.
Although there is no settled definition of the term "federal common law," it will be
sufficient here to define it as federal law made by judges "that cannot fairly be de-
scribed as simply the application of federal statutory or constitutional enactments."
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., et al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal
System 744 (4th ed. 1996).
7. B&GI, supra note 1, at 819-20, 870. Moreover, if I read B&GI correctly,
under its proposal, the incorporation of a customary international law rule as federal
law within a given statutory context, e.g. the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1994), would not authorize its application as federal law in any other context.
In this Response, I have tried to capitalize the word "State" when used to refer to
one of the fifty States and to leave it uncapitalized when referring to a state in the
sense of international law. I have not tampered with capitalization in quotations.
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position, asserting their undesirability. In this part, I will address the
first prong.
A. The Road to the Modern Position
To understand the critique, it is necessary to recall why the "modern
position" is modern. As B&GI partly explains, the United States has
passed through a series of stages in the conceptualization of interna-
tional law and its relation to domestic law. In the intellectual world of
the late eighteenth century, the law of nations was understood as a
branch of natural law, deducible by reason and not merely from con-
vention, and obligatory on all nations.' Two of the English jurists
most influential in the United States, Blackstone and Lord Mansfield,
had affirmed the principle that the law of nations was incorporated
into the common law of England.' In the early Republic, the interac-
tion of the newly-minted federalism with the common law heritage
was controverted and the implications of various solutions had not
been fully thought through.' 0 Nor had the relationship pimong natural
law, statute law, and written constitutions been settled. In fact, B&GI
does not propose an originalist argument that we should return to the
intellectual approach of the Framers and adopt their understanding of
international law and its relationship to domestic law."
As the nineteenth century progressed, two important changes oc-
curred. First, positivist jurisprudence superseded naturalist jurispru-
dence as the prevailing approach to international law.12 Second, a
regime for dividing the common law powers between State and fed-
eral courts was established. This regime limited the federal courts'
power to decree federal common law, but permitted them to partici-
pate in the elaboration of the "general common law" that they shared
with the States in cases governed neither by statute nor by distinc-
tively "local" law. Under this regime, associated today with the 1842
8. See, eg., Edwin D. Dickinson, Changing Concepts and tire Doctrine of Incor-
poration, 26 Am. J. Int'l L. 239, 253 (1932); Stewart Jay, The Stants of tire Law of
Nations in Early American Law, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 819, 822-23 (1989); Harold H.
Sprout, Theories as to the Applicability of International Law in the Federal Courts of
the United States, 26 Am. J. Int'l L. 280, 280 (1932).
9. Sprout, supra note 8, at 282-85.
10. For historical accuracy, it is important to distinguish-as Bradley and Gold-
smith do not always do-between the first decades under the Constitution and the
later nineteenth century. In the first decades, the common law jurisdiction of the
federal courts was highly uncertain and a matter of partisan dispute. See Edwin De-
witt Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States,
II, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 792, 792-95 (1953); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common
Law: Part One, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1003, 1010-11 (1985). The narrower Jeffersonian
view prevailed later, but it should not be anachronistically projected backward. Id. at
1017-18.
11. I mention this not as a criticism, but as a clarification.
12. See Dickinson, supra note 8, at 253, 259-60; Sprout, supra note 8, at 280-81. It
would therefore be a mistake to associate the pre-Erie regime with a naturalist ap-
proach to international law.
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decision in Swift v. Tyson,13 customary international law came to be
treated as part of the "general common law," assertable in both State
and federal courts, but not specifically federal in character.1 4 The oft-
quoted case of The Paquete Habana15 illustrates the federal applica-
tion of international law in that period. The Paquete Habana invoked
a rule of customary international law to declare unlawful two U.S.
naval ships' seizure of fishing vessels in Cuban waters during the
Spanish-American War. "International law," wrote Justice Gray, "is
part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of
right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination."'1 6
B&GI focuses on the transition from the regime of Swift v. Tyson to
the modern regime of judicial federalism declared by the 1938 deci-
sion Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,17 implementing Justice Holmes'
realist critique of the "general common law.""8 After Erie, most of
the "general common law" was dissolved into various bodies of State
common law to be elaborated authoritatively by the courts of each
State. At the same time, the Supreme Court recognized that some
portions of the "general common law" had addressed matters of over-
riding national interest that could not be left to the varying wills of the
several States and which should therefore be retained as genuinely
"federal common law." 9 The question thus arose whether customary
international law should be regarded as rules that each State was free
to adopt, discard, or modify in the exercise of its local sovereignty (as
B&GI now maintains °) or whether customary international law
should be kept uniform, and therefore federal.
Philip Jessup called attention to the problem and the desirability of
the federal solution the year after Erie was decided. He wrote:
[A]ny attempt to extend the doctrine of the Tompkins case to inter-
national law should be repudiated by the Supreme Court. Mr. Jus-
tice Brandeis was surely not thinking of international law when he
wrote his dictum. Any question of applying international law in our
courts involves the foreign relations of the United States and can
thus be brought within a federal power. The application of interna-
tional law by the federal courts does not need to be justified by the
13. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
14. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286 (1875) (holding that
Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to review state court's misinterpretation of law of
nations). Justice Bradley filed a prescient dissent. Id. at 287 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
15. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
16. Id. at 700.
17. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
18. Id.; see Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
19. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110
(1938) (decided the same day as Erie); see D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit
Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
20. See B&GI, supra note 1, at 870.
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theory that we took over international law as part of the common
law. ... The duty to apply it is one imposed upon the United States
as an international person. The several states of the Union are enti-
ties unknown to international law. It would be as unsound as it
would be unwise to make our state courts our ultimate authority for
pronouncing the rules of international law.21
The question remained unresolved until 1964, when Justice Harlan's
opinion for the Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino2- in-
yoked Jessup's article with approval.
Another development between 1842 and 1938 must be mentioned
here: the strengthening of national sovereignty by the Civil War and
the recognition of implied foreign affairs powers vested in Congress
and the President. Rather than strictly construing particular grants of
power to the federal political branches, the Supreme Court ascribed to
them those powers it considered necessary for the exercise of the ex-
ternal sovereignty of the nation. This process reached its conceptual
peak in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,' where Justice
Sutherland expounded his theory of direct transmission of foreign af-
fairs powers from the Crown to the nation at the time of the Revolu-
tion.24 A year later, the Court also approved the President's creation
of federal law supreme over the States through a sole executive agree-
ment, noting that "complete power over international affairs is in the
national government and is not and cannot be subject to any curtail-
ment or interference on the part of the several states." ''
Against this background, Justice Harlan's opinion in Sabbatino
reconceptualized the act of state doctrine as a product of judicial law-
making ancillary to the federal political branches' conduct of interna-
tional relations.26 He affirmed the doctrine's legitimacy as a rule of
federal common law and emphasized its supremacy over contrary
rules of State law, explicitly analogizing it to Jessup's account of cus-
tomary international law as federal law. He noted that Jessup had
"cautioned that rules of international law should not be left to diver-
gent and perhaps parochial state interpretations. His basic rationale is
21. Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to Inter-
national Law, 33 Am. J. Int'l L. 740, 743 (1939) (footnotes omitted).
22. 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964).
23. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
24. Id. at 316. Sutherland's theory remains controversial. It illustrates, however,
the modem trend toward a unified conception of the federal foreign affairs powers, as
opposed to the clause-by-clause parsing exhibited in portions of B&GI. See B&GI,
supra note 1, at 856-57.
25. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
26. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,421-27 (1964). The act of
state doctrine is a rule that, with some exceptions, "precludes the courts of this coun-
try from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign
power committed within its own territory." Id. at 401: see W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v.
Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l, 493 U.S. 400 (1990) (emphasizing the limits of
the act of state doctrine); Restatement (Third), supra note 5, § 443.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
equally applicable to the act of state doctrine."27 This endorsement
eventually led to the consensus in favor of the modern position, a sim-
ilar reconceptualization of the incorporation of customary interna-
tional law into U.S. law.
As B&GI recognizes, the modern position has its variants. 28 Un-
derstanding that there is no canonical statement, I would offer a precis
as follows: The existence and content of rules of customary interna-
tional law that are binding on the United States is to be determined as
a matter of federal law.29 Such rules are presumptively incorporated
into the U.S. domestic legal system and given effect as rules of federal
law. I say "presumptively," because contrary norms found in the Con-
stitution, federal statutes or treaties, or valid presidential acts may su-
persede the applicability of a particular rule, altogether or in specific
circumstances.3 °
In my own opinion, this doctrine is itself a rule of federal common
law, ancillary to the political branches' conduct of foreign relations.3"
Although it has a pedigree stretching back to the beginning of the
Republic, I do not believe that it is constitutionally mandated. The
doctrine enables the federal courts to fill the gap left when Congress
has not specified the domestic legal stance toward an international
obligation of the United States or of a foreign state.32 In carrying out
this function, the federal courts exercise a limited role; they can apply
only those norms that external evidence demonstrates embody genu-
ine international legal obligations binding on the United States. As
legal realists, we know that judges have discretion at the margins in
recognizing and applying these norms; but they do not exercise the
innovating powers of State common law courts. Incorporation at the
federal level respects the national character of foreign relations: the
States are not entitled to adopt individual approaches to international
27. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425 (emphasis added).
28. B&GI, supra note 1, at 816 n.2.
29. The limitation to rules that are binding on the United States gives recognition
to the international law doctrine that states dissenting from a new custom during its
formation are not bound by it, although it is binding among other states. See Restate-
ment (Third), supra note 5, § 111 cmt. b. There is also a narrow category of peremp-
tory, orjus cogens norms that bind even dissenters. Id. § 102 cmt. k, reporters' note 6.
In the unlikely event that such a norm unacceptable to the United States arose, the
federal government would still have the power to exclude its domestic application.
30. In addition, an applicable rule does not always determine the outcome of a
specific case, which may turn instead on other issues such as standing, immunity, or
the political question doctrine.
31. Similarly, I would be content to label the incorporated rules as rules of federal
common law. Readers familiar with the literature will have observed that my pre-
ferred version of the modern position differs from that proposed by Professor Louis
Henkin. See Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 Mich. L.
Rev. 1555 (1984).
32. Congress's frequent silence on such matters is further encouraged by the long-
standing traditions of incorporating customary international law and of construing
statutes to avoid conflict with international law.
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law. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized disputes implicat-
ing foreign relations as one of the areas where the creation of federal
common law is justified by an overriding federal interest.33
B. B&GI and the ALI
The account given in B&GI of how the consensus in favor of the
modem position solidified is badly misinformed. The article asserts
that the Reporters misled the American Law Institute into adopting
an approach supported only by academic commentary. It claims that
the Third Restatement's position had no legal support, but rather was
a feat of "doctrinal bootstrapping" and "academic fiat." The improba-
bility of this account is magnified by an additional fact that B&GI
notes obliquely: the Reagan administration actively participated in
the discussion of the Restatement and strongly objected to some of
the proposals, including certain aspects of the draft provisions on the
effects of customary international law.a Yet the characterization of
customary international law as federal law excited no controversy.
Surely one must wonder why the Reagan administration would sit idly
by while this coup occurred.
To the contrary, the modern position has enjoyed affirmative execu-
tive support. As early as 1969, the Nixon administration filed an ami-
cus brief in the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that under
Sabbatino, customary international law was federal law that must be
enforced." That case, Republic of Argentina v. City of New York, 3
involved the immunity of a consulate from taxation, an issue of for-
eign state immunity that is governed by customary international law in
the absence of a treaty.37 Similarly, in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,38 whose
33. See Atherton v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 666, 673-74 (1997): Boyle v. United Techs.
Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (citing Sabbatino); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).
34. See B&GI, supra note 1, at 835 & n.136; Harold G. Maier, The Authoritative
Sources of Customary International Law in the United States, 10 Mich. J. Int'l L 450,
464 (1989) (noting "unprecedented intervention" by Justice and State Departments).
Maier's discussion particularly emphasizes the suggestion that customary interna-
tional law supersedes prior statutes. Id. at 470-73.
35. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3-4, 34-36, Republic of Argen-
tina v. City of New York, 250 N.E.2d 698 (N.Y. 1969).
36. 250 N.E.2d 698 (N.Y. 1969). Argentina, supported by the federal government,
prevailed. The court's reasoning may be susceptible to different interpretations. I
read it as recognizing a federally-derived obligation for "all domestic courts" to apply
customary international law. Republic of Argentina does not explicitly confirm that
the law it applies is federal. The opinion is unambiguous, however, in stating that it
applies customary international law by obligation and not, as B&GI would have it, by
choice.
37. kd- at 699. After the decision in Republic of Argentina, the United States
became a party to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. But consular im-
munity is still governed by customary law as between the United States and states that
are parties neither to the Consular Convention nor to a bilateral treaty with the
United States. See Restatement (Third), supra note 5, ch. 6, at 457. Moreover, the
Consular Convention itself affirms "that the rules of customary international law con-
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role in B&GI will receive more attention later, the Second Circuit
adopted its view of the customary international law ban on torture as
federal law at the explicit urging of the Carter administration.
Judge Henry Friendly, normally regarded as a respectable authority
on the federal common law, viewed Sabbatino as affirming the federal
character of customary international law in a 1972 decision, Fiocconi
v. Attorney General.3 9 Fiocconi involved customary international law
limits on the prosecution of individuals who had been extradited on
the basis of comity rather than under an extradition treaty. The Sec-
ond Circuit explained that those limits bound the court, as a rule of
"United States foreign relations law," 40 not to permit prosecution for
additional crimes unrelated to those for which extradition had been
granted, but found the new charges sufficiently related.
Thus-contrary to the bootstrapping theory of B&GI-the 1980
Tentative Draft of the Restatement reflected the widely held conclu-
sion, shared by judges and the Executive Branch as well as commenta-
tors, that Sabbatino's endorsement of the modern position indicated
that customary international law was federal law, not State law, after
Erie.41 Once we discard the charge that the American Law Institute
was subordinated to academic fiat, it should be easy to recognize why
the Executive would favor the modern position. The State Depart-
ment wants control over the nation's compliance with its international
obligations. Without the uniformity of federal law, government attor-
neys would have to persuade fifty independent State legal systems to
adopt customary norms voluntarily. The "general common law" had
provided a coordinating concept that linked those systems in a joint
interpretive enterprise; without a replacement, its dismantling would
free the States to follow their separate wills, to the detriment of U.S.
tinue to govern matters not expressly regulated by the provisions of the present Con-
vention .... " Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, preamble,
21 U.S.T. 77, 79, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 262.
38. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (recognizing torture as a violation of customary
international law and thus as providing a basis in federal common law for jurisdiction
under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994)).
39. 462 F.2d 475, 479-80 & n.7 (2d Cir. 1972) (citing Sabbatino and quoting the
usual sentence about international law as "part of our law" from The Paquete
Habana).
Another, better-known opinion of Judge Friendly's, HT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d
1001 (2d Cir. 1975), expressed rather tersely the view that, in order for the Alien Tort
Statute not to exceed proper federal jurisdiction under Article III, its application to
suits between nondiverse parties should be limited to cases involving violations of
customary international law. Id. at 1015. Presumably this comment reflects the same
assumption that customary international law is federal law.
40. Fiocconi, 462 F.2d at 479 (citing Sabbatino). Judge Friendly had earlier used
the phrase "federal law of foreign relations" to describe the category of federal com-
mon law approved by Sabbatino, in the published version of his well-known lecture
on federal common law. See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New
Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 408 n.119 (1964).
41. Restatement of the Law, Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Re-
vised) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1980).
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foreign relations. The characteristics of supremacy over State law and
reviewability in the Supreme Court make federal common law an ex-
cellent instrument for protection of the federal interest.
After erroneously denying that anything relevant occurred between
1964 and 1980, B&GI continues its attack on the Restatement by at-
tempting to explain away the body of case law decided between 1980
and 1986, when the Restatement was adopted by the ALI.4 2 Although
the authors cannot deny that these decisions hold that customary in-
ternational law enters the U.S. legal system as federal law,43 they insist
on divorcing these cases from the Restatement by attributing differ-
ences in reasoning to them. Thus, we are told that the Second Cir-
cuit's 1980 decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala" "did not provide
reliable support for the Restatement (Third)'s position because Filar-
tiga rested squarely on nineteenth century precedents, whereas the
Restatement (Third) correctly acknowledged that CIL was not federal
law in the nineteenth century. 45 In other words, because the Filartiga
opinion attempted to synthesize cases from all periods of U.S. history,
including The Paquete Habana and Sabbatino, into a consistent whole,
it cannot be cited in support of the modern position. 6
B&GI misses the fact that the novelty of Filartiga did not lie in its
recognition of customary international law as federal law. The novelty
of Filartiga lay in the Second Circuit's belated recognition that cus-
tomary international law had expanded to impose limits on a state's
treatment of its own nationals. The district court had dismissed the
case on the ground that circuit precedent excluded such issues from
the scope of "the law of nations."47 The Second Circuit had requested
the State Department to submit a memorandum setting forth its posi-
42. See Restatement (Third), supra note 5, at 5 (noting adoption on May 14, 1986).
43. It is also worth noting that Judge Bork's opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), while refusing to create a federal common
law cause of action to remedy an alleged violation of customary international law,
fully accepted that the international norm itself (if it existed) would be federal com-
mon law. See idt at 810-11; see also id. at 804 & n.10 (identifying customary interna-
tional law as federal law for jurisdictional purposes).
44. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
45. B&GI, supra note 1, at 836 (footnotes omitted).
46. See id. at 834 n.125. B&GI further claims that Filartiga -made no attempt to
fit CIL within the rationale of Sabbatino or, more broadly, the post-Erie federal com-
mon law." Id. at 834. To the contrary, the Filartiga opinion characterizes the Alien
Tort Statute as "part of an articulated scheme of federal control over external affairs,"
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885, invokes the Federalist on the need for uniform interpreta-
tion of both treaties and the law of nations, id. at 887, and emphasizes -Ithe Framers'
overarching concern that control over international affairs be vested in the new na-
tional government." Id. It cites both Sabbatino and The Paquete Habana for the prop-
osition that customary international law forms part of the laws of the United States
without prior statutory authorization. In addition, it cites decisions holding that fed-
eral question jurisdiction extends to cases where the claim arises under post-Erie fed-
eral common law. Id. at 886 (citing Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972),
and Ivy Broad. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1968)).
47. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 879-80.
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tion on the case.48 The resulting Memorandum devoted an argument
heading and several pages to the proposition that "[i]nternational law
now embraces the obligation of a state to respect the fundamental
human rights of its citizens,, 49 and only a footnote to the noncontro-
versial proposition that "[c]ustomary international law is federal law,
to be enunciated authoritatively by the federal courts," citing Sabba-
tino and The Paquete Habana."
No doubt Filartiga and other opinions would have been more schol-
arly if they had accurately portrayed the stage-by-stage evolution of
U.S. approaches to international law. But the Erie decision did not
require that federal courts stop citing cases decided before 1938 and
reinvent federal common law from scratch. The Supreme Court has
continued to rely on pre-1938 cases about federal officers' immunity
from suit and interstate boundary disputes.51 Former doctrines of
"general common law" have been reconceptualized as doctrines of
federal common law that continue to govern in areas of dominant fed-
eral concern. The continued circulation of old wine in new bottles is a
standard process of doctrinal evolution, even after major realignments
like Erie.
Thus, the delegitimation tactic fails. It is not the modern position in
the Restatement that lacks support, but rather B&GI.
II. B}GAND FEDERAL VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Although B&GI artificially divides them, the traditional justifica-
tion for the modern position lies in history, Sabbatino, and the federal
power over foreign affairs (B&GI calls this third element the "struc-
tural authorization argument").5 2 B&GI objects to the modern posi-
tion both from the federal perspective (which I will consider here) and
from the perspective of the States (part of which I will consider in Part
III). At the federal level, B&GI rejects judicial enforcement of cus-
tomary international law as unjustifiable interference with "the polit-
ical branches." This quick dismissal involves errors of commission
and omission. First, B&GI's quarrel here is less with the Restatement
than with speculative variants on the modern position offered by par-
48. See 19 I.L.M. 585 (1980) (reprinting the text of the Memorandum, which was
submitted jointly by the Departments of Justice and State). Significant portions of the
brief were also excerpted in the State Department's 1980 Digest of United States
Practice in International Law 11-13, 253-62 (1986).
49. 19 I.L.M. 585, 589-95 (1980).
50. Id. at 606 n.49. The footnote also cited a Yale student note written shortly
after Sabbatino, setting forth how Sabbatino justified the recognition of customary
international law as federal common law and how this recognition supported the
Alien Tort Statute. See Note, Federal Common Law and Article III: A Jurisdictional
Approach to Erie, 74 Yale L.J. 325 (1964).
51. See, e.g., Illinois v. Kentucky, 500 U.S. 380, 384 (1991) (interstate boundary);
Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1959) (plurality opinion) (officers' immunity).
52. B&GI, supra note 1, at 860.
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ticular scholars. Second, B&GI ignores the fact that customary inter-
national law has other functions at the federal level aside from
restricting Congress and the President.5
A glance at the issue of federal statutes illustrates the first point.
Declaring that customary international law is genuinely federal com-
mon law, and not some other form of federal law akin to federal com-
mon law, would not give judges the power to override earlier statutes
that are still in force. Federal common law is made within the frame-
work of existing federal statutes, not in contradiction to it. The Re-
porters' initial suggestion that the later-in-time rule, by which treaties
and customary law supersede each another on the international plane,
should be replicated in domestic law was not adopted by the ALI, and
the Restatement indicates that the issue has "not been authoritatively
determined."54
Far more important, however, is the Paquete Habana problem, the
application of customary international law to the acts of executive of-
ficers. B&GI includes this question in its indictment of the modem
position and observes that the problem would not arise at all if cus-
tomary international law were never federal law.55 But its discussion
collapses all relevant distinctions. In The Paquete Habana, the
Supreme Court enforced a rule of customary international law against
naval officers, and its opinion indicated that judicial enforcement
would yield to a "controlling executive or legislative act. " 51' Main-
stream commentators and the Restatement agree that the President,
in the exercise of his foreign affairs powers, has discretion to violate
customary international law without judicial contradiction.57 Yet this
view of the President's authority is wholly consistent with the applica-
tion of federal common law to acts of federal officials whose violations
lack specific higher authorization. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in
53. The failure to recognize a positive role at the federal level may also explain
why B&GI characterizes the application of federal common law against the States as
an example of "dormant foreign affairs preemption." Id. at 862.
54. Restatement (Third), supra note 5. § 115 cmt. d. Compare id. and reporters'
note 4 with tentative draft § 135(1) cmt. b and reporters' note 1. Although B&GI
does not recognize it as such, this dispute is in significant degree about the powers of
the President vis-a-vis Congress or the Senate, not about the powers of the courts vis-
a-vis the political branches. See Trimble, supra note 2. at 682-84.
55. See B&GI, supra note 1, at 844-46, 861.
56. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
57. See, e.g., Restatement (Third), supra note 5, §§ 111 cmt. c, 115 reporters' note
5; Jonathan I. Charney, The Power of the Executive Branch of the United States Gov-
ernment to Iolate Customary International Law, 80 Am. J. Int'l L 913, 92.0 (1986);
The Revised Draft Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States and
Customary International Law, 79 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 73, 88-89 (1985) (remarks of
Oscar Schachter). Henkin specifies his view, however, that the President's authority
to violate customary international law depends on whether he is exercising his own
inherent powers or merely acting as Congress's delegate in domestic affairs. Louis
Henkin, The President and International Law, 80 Am. J. Int'l L 930, 936 (1986).
B&GI pays no attention to that distinction, either.
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Garcia-Mir v. Meese,58 cited in B&GI, turned on the question of
whether the Attorney General, as a cabinet officer, shared the Presi-
dent's authority to issue a "controlling executive act" (and found that
he did). 59 The district court decision in Fernandez v. Wilkinson,60 also
cited in B&GI, similarly involved a challenge to the action of "the
Attorney General and his delegates," not the President.61
By ignoring the orthodox version of the modern position, B&GI
misses one of the central difficulties with its State law proposal. Re-
ducing customary international law to State common law would free
not only the President, but also federal officers at every level, to com-
mit violations because State common law rules cannot authoritatively
control the action of federal officers within the scope of their duties. 62
Federal law can incorporate or authorize State regulation, but a fed-
eral decision to do so would still be required. Moreover, one might
well ask which State's common law could be thought to govern the
subject matter of The Paquete Habana, the capture of ships in Cuban
waters. Prior to Erie, the "general common law" could be used to
ensure compliance with international law by lower executive officials,
but after Erie, only a federal policy of compliance can serve that
purpose.
Similarly, the courts need federal law not only to evaluate the ac-
tions of executive officers, but also to guide their own actions. Con-
sider, as a simplified example, the customary international law of
consular immunity; assume no relevant statute or treaty, and assume
that after Erie, federal courts have no authority to incorporate cus-
tomary international norms into federal law. Then the federal courts
would be required to follow State law in cases brought on State law
claims, either affording or violating consular immunity according to
the practice of the State. At the same time, the federal courts would
be powerless to afford consular immunity in cases brought on federal
claims. Such a regime would be absurd and wholly inconsistent with
the national character of U.S. foreign relations. Contrary to B&GI,
federal courts must have the power to adopt customary international
58. 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986).
59. Id. at 1454-55. Even the controversial Barr opinion on extraterritorial abduc-
tions, relying on Garcia-Mir, expresses doubt that a violation of customary interna-
tional law could be authorized by an official below cabinet rank. See Authority of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation to Override International Law in Extraterritorial
Law Enforcement Activities, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 163, 180 (1989).
60. 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980) (finding arbitrary detention to be a violation
of customary international law and an abuse of discretion on the part of the Attorney
General and his delegates), affd on other grounds, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
61. Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 792, 798, 800.
62. See, e.g., Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 180 (1988) (requiring
clear and unambiguous congressional authorization for direct State regulation of fed-
eral installation); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 597 (1959) (holding that federal law
must govern the defense of privilege in a State law defamation claim against a federal
official).
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norms to restrain their own conduct, in the absence of conflicting di-
rections from the political branches.6"
Thus, B&GI would replace the modern position with a system in
which, without prior authorization by statute or treaty, federal courts
would be powerless to prevent violations of customary international
law by lower-level executive officials, or even by themseh'es. Even if
we ignored the problem of cacophony resulting from independent and
unreviewable enunciation of customary international law by the
States, this gap would justify a post-Erie federal common law.
III. STATES' RIGHTs, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND DEMOCRACY
B&GI is on firmer ground in stating that the modern position en-
tails the conclusion that, in the face of congressional silence, custom-
ary international law will be supreme over the laws of the States. The
authors attack this consequence by associating it with a broader, less
well-defined notion they term "dormant foreign relations preemp-
tion,"' and insist that it is undemocratic' and involves "a dramatic
transfer of constitutional authority from the states to the world com-
munity and to the federal judiciary."66 I will not try to deal with the
broader notion of dormant preemption here, but will address the
question whether judicial enforcement of customary international law
is inconsistent with American democratic tradition.
I do not deny that the modern position shifts some degree of power
from the States, relative to what they would have under the B&GI
proposal. But I see the main recipients of that power as Congress and
the federal Executive Branch.
Viewing the argument in its full generality, one might think it was
rather late to claim that judicial application of customary international
law was in principle inconsistent with the American understanding of
democracy. Although the precise content of customary international
law has varied from generation to generation, it has always provided
externally generated standards for the decision of cases within the do-
mestic legal system. Indeed, if the external origin of the norm is ob-
jectionable, the same problem inheres in B&Grs proposed solution-
the enforcement of customary international law as State common law.
Absent State legislative action, the citizens in States with nonelected
judiciaries would be entitled to complain against their State judges
that the judges were undemocratically imposing on them norms de-
rived from a remote international community.
Admittedly, State common law decisions can be overturned by
State legislatures. But federal common law decisions can be over-
63. For more on this example, see infra Part IV.C.
64. B&GI, supra note 1, at 862-68.
65. Id. at 857-58.
66. Id. at 846.
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turned by Congress. So the argument from democracy really boils
down to the setting of a default rule and the choice of the level at
which the default option can be rejected. In the absence of specific
action by federal statute or treaty, should courts apply customary in-
ternational law norms or disregard them? Our system follows a prac-
tice of presumptive enforceability of customary international law,
subject to congressional override. While this is not direct democracy,
it is a form of representative democracy appropriate to a system in
which responsibility for foreign relations is vested at the national
level.
B&GI claims that independent State authority to declare customary
international law would not impair the ability of the United States to
"speak[ ] with one voice" in the process of forming customary interna-
tional law because the States would be likely to defer to the federal
executive's view of what international law requires.67 But that is just
saying that independent State authority would be harmless so long as
it were not exercised. Why wage such an uphill battle to return this
authority to the States if their independence is not truly desirable?
The States have no reserved sovereignty to act on the international
plane; the Constitution was designed to take that away from them.
Nor does our constitutional system require formal representation of
the States in the formation of international obligations. New York,
for example, might prefer a greater say in the withdrawal of prime real
estate from New York City's tax base,68 but the Constitution gives it
no veto power. Even indirect representation through the Senate and
the House of Representatives is not always a prerequisite to federal
action affecting a State's interests. Sometimes the President can dis-
place State policies through the negotiation of a sole executive agree-
ment;69 sometimes the President can displace them through
participation in the creation of a customary norm.
B&GI argues, however, that whatever may have been true for the
"old" customary law, the situation has been changed by the advent of
a customary law of human rights. This would be an ironic occasion for
abandoning the practice of incorporation. To be sure, the Nuremberg
trials inaugurated an expansion of customary international law into
the previously unaddressed realm of a state's most basic duties to its
own citizens. But how was this transformation brought about? Brad-
ley and Goldsmith write as if the United States had been a passive
observer of the Nuremberg trials, the adoption of the Universal Dec-
67. Id. at 871.
68. Cf. Republic of Argentina v. City of New York, 250 N.E.2d 698 (N.Y. 1969)
(holding that a foreign consulate is exempt from municipal real estate taxes under
customary international law). Republic of Argentina is discussed supra at notes 35-37
and accompanying text.
69. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937); Restatement (Third),
supra note 5, § 303 & cmt. j. Belmont was written by no less a friend of federalism
than Justice Sutherland.
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laration of Human Rights, and the later unfolding of human rights
law. To the contrary, the United States itself, including both Congress
and the President, have given impetus to the recognition of core
human rights as international legal obligations even in the absence of
human rights treaties.7" Moreover, as we have seen, the recognition
of customary human rights norms as enforceable federal law in Filar-
tiga was also encouraged by the federal executive. Thus, the norma-
tivity of international human rights did not just happen to the United
States; the political branches deliberately participated in its creation.
On the other hand, American democratic tradition includes many
strands, some of which have opposed the domestic application of in-
ternational human rights norms. The segregationist strand contrib-
uted significantly to resistance to human rights treaties in the name of
States' rights in the 1940s and 1950s.7 1 Another contributing factor
was the suspicion that international tribunals were biased against the
United States, which has informed a broader reluctance to submit to
international adjudication. Objections that had been raised against
the New Deal-fear of bureaucracy, opposition to redistribution, and
preference for State sovereignty-were reasserted. These elements of
American tradition produced the movement for the Bricker Amend-
ment, which would have restricted the federal treaty power. The
movement failed, but some of its concerns survive, and they delayed
for many years the ratification of human rights treaties.
Has the Bricker controversy reoriented the American conception of
democracy so that international law has lost its traditional legitimacy,
even in the fields of the "old" customary law? B&GI suggests, in ef-
fect, that it should have,7 2 but provides no evidence that it did. I see
no sign, for example, that after 1950 the executive branch or the
courts were embarrassed about complying with international custom
in matters of diplomatic or consular immunity, or about adjusting to
changes in customary practice. Nor have the courts displayed discom-
fort with the customary law of treaties. Despite the stalemate be-
tween the President and the Senate over the ratification of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, courts have followed the State
Department's advice that many of its provisions are declaratory of
70. See, eg., Oscar Schachter, International Law Implications of U.S. Human
Rights Policies, 24 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 63 (1978-79).
71. See generally Natalie Hevener Kaufman, Human Rights Treaties and the Sen-
ate: A History of Opposition (1990) (describing early opposition to human rights
treaties and consequences in later years); Duane Tananbaum, The Bricker Amend-
ment Controversy: A Test of Eisenhower's Political Leadership (1988) (analyzing the
politics of the Bricker Amendment in the 1950s).
72. See B&GI, supra note 1, at 858-59, 869-70. Although B&GI attempts to draw
broad conclusions from the Senate's reluctance to ratify human rights treaties or to
accept them as self-executing, B&GI does not expressly invoke the Bricker legacy,




customary law.73 Thus, the traditional legitimacy of the "old" custom-
ary law seems unimpaired.
Should the "new CIL" be regarded differently? In the process of
insisting upon the universality of core human rights obligations, the
United States has cooperated in the development of customary norms
and, as B&GI notes, the United States cannot unilaterally control the
content of those norms.74 In some respects, customary law may re-
quire less than the United States would have preferred.75 In other
instances, the United States may have acquiesced in the creation of an
international norm stricter than it would have preferred as one of the
compromises that make international cooperation possible. There
may also be instances in which the United States has persistently dis-
sented from the development of a customary norm in such a way that
the norm binds others, but not the United States. 76
Absent such dissent, customary human rights norms represent valid
international obligations of the United States. Most if not all of them
have enjoyed affirmative U.S. support and are redundant vis-A-vis the
States because they mirror norms of domestic constitutional law.
Their primary significance in U.S. law may currently lie in litigation
against foreign government officials, who are not bound by the U.S.
Constitution. But if the United States has acquired human rights obli-
gations that impose further limitations on the States, then these obli-
gations are presumptively enforceable. If Congress opposes the
application of such norms in domestic law, it has the constitutional
authority to deny them domestic enforcement. I do not see a large
73. See Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before
United States Courts, 28 Va. J. Int'l L. 281 (1988). Ratification was prevented in 1972
by the Senate's insistence on an understanding and interpretation that would have
restricted the use of executive agreements. See Robert E. Dalton, The Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties: Consequences for the United States, 78 Am. Soc'y Int'l
L. Proc. 276, 276-77 (1984); Frankowska, supra at 295-301.
Trimble would explain the courts' acceptance of the Convention's rules by asserting
that executive advice performs the needed legitimating function and that the courts
follow the executive's lead. See Trimble, supra note 2, at 684-87, 692. But that expla-
nation would not satisfy B&GI's criteria for democratic legitimacy, and it would sup-
port Filartiga. See id. at 695.
74. B&GI, supra note 1, at 858.
75. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 71, at 78-81 (noting disappointment that post-
war human rights law did not emphasize protection of property rights).
76. Two possible examples are a customary norm prohibiting execution for crimes
committed before age eighteen and a customary norm requiring states to regulate
hate speech. It is possible instead that these putative norms have not become custom-
ary international law, in part because of the United States' opposition. See, e.g., Gen-
eral Comment No. 24(52), U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 1382nd meeting, 52nd
Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 839, 842
(1995) (listing these as norms of customary international law); Observations of the
United States of America on General Comment No. 24(52), reprinted in 16 Hum. Rts.
L.J. 422-23 (1995) (denying that these are norms of customary international law); The-
odor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law 98-99
(1989) (discussing status of prohibition of juvenile death penalty as customary norm).
[Vol. 66
HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS & U.S. LAW
discontinuity here with the tradition of incorporating the "old" cus-
tomary international law, once we accept-unlike Senator Bricker-
the legitimacy of federal regulation in the field of human rights.
Buried in B&Grs attack on the modern position, however, is an
argument of a different character. B&GI briefly contends that the
President and the Senate have in fact taken steps to prevent the en-
forcement of human rights norms in the United States by declaring
certain treaties non-self-executing, and that applying the modern posi-
tion to customary human rights norms circumvents this directive.'
This argument deserves exploration with greater precision and docu-
mentation than B&GI gives it. One might concede the validity of the
modern position and analyze whether the terms of ratification of a
particular treaty-or perhaps a class of treaties7 -should be inter-
preted beyond their literal language as a "controlling act" dictating
that customary norms that coincide with any provision of the treaty
should no longer be incorporated into federal law. Such an analysis
would require attention to a series of relevant factors that neither
B&GI nor B&GI1 provides. 79 I cannot say in advance how that analy-
sis would turn out. But in either case the modern position would ac-
commodate the result. This fact should reinforce the compatibility of
the modern position with American democratic traditions.
At last we are in a position to consider the question of judicial activ-
ism. I could agree that judges would produce "undemocratic" results
if they prematurely enforced so-called "emerging norms" of custom-
ary international law. The judges would also be misapplying the mod-
ern position. As the Restatement clearly expresses, the norm to be
applied must be a genuine norm of customary international law and
one validly binding on the United States. The position of the federal
Executive Branch on what customary international law requires, if
available, deserves considerable deference. At the same time, the
normativity of law requires that once a right has been embodied in
77. See B&GI, supra note 1, at 869-70.
78. B&GI lumps together "various multilateral treaties" on human rights and at-
tempts to draw conclusions about the "new CIL" in general. B&GI, supra note 1, at
869. This method of reasoning is much too imprecise. Even the treatment of human
rights treaties has not been uniform.
79. For example, the reservations, understandings, and declarations have generally
addressed only the treaty itself and have not been directed at repealing other domes-
tic law consistent with the treaty. Second, a reservation to a treaty provision that
codifies a customary norm may be intended to deny the customary character of the
norm, or it may be intended to exclude the enforcement of the norm from the particu-
lar procedures (typically international in character) involved in that treaty regime.
Third, declarations of non-self-executing character have sometimes been attached to
treaties for which implementing legislation has already been enacted and, therefore,
do not always evidence an intention that the treaty provisions not receive judicial
enforcement. Fourth, because human rights treaties generally include provisions de-
claratory of customary law and also other provisions, a declaration that the entire




federal common law, the executive cannot retain direct control over
its elaboration and application to particular cases. But the executive
has subtler methods for influencing its development, and Congress
can replace common law norms by statutes or repeal them altogether.
Within these limits, judges have a salutary role to play in clarifying
and impartially enforcing customary human rights norms. The impar-
tiality of the courts is an asset to the federal government because it
reinforces the credibility of the political branches in their own calls for
compliance with customary human rights norms by other countries.
The judicial function is not mechanical, and judges who interpret and
apply human rights norms will inevitably infuse to some degree their
individual versions of American values. One could label this judicial
activism if one were so inclined. But overruling the well-established
tradition of incorporation would be a more massive exercise in judicial
activism.
IV. B&GIl
In B&GII, Professors Bradley and Goldsmith amplify, and in some
respects modify, the arguments of B&GI. I will not burden the reader
with a reply to every allegation B&GII makes about this Response.80
Nor will I expand the scope of this Response to address the debates
among the other participants. Instead, I will concentrate on what
B&GII tells us about the ALL, democracy, and the "old" customary
international law.
A. B&GII and the ALI
In a welcome development, Professors Bradley and Goldsmith dis-
tance themselves from the accusations that B&GI made about the
drafting of the Third Restatement. 81 Confronted with indisputable ev-
idence that the modern position enjoyed more than academic support
between 1965 and 1980, they concede the facts. They then try to
downplay the significance of those facts, and they repeat the fallacious
argument that Filartiga and its progeny did not properly support the
Restatement because Filartiga got its history wrong.
Despite these efforts, the evidence refutes the authors' attempt to
discredit the Restatement. They may prefer a different interpretation
80. Illustrative is Bradley and Goldsmith's claim that I mistakenly assume that
under their proposal customary international law must be enforceable by courts and
thus enforceable as State common law. B&GII, supra note 1, at 349 n.174. To the
contrary, this Response says more than once, though it does not repeat obsessively,
that under the B&GI proposal State courts would be free to adopt, reject, or impose
their own views of customary international law. Other passages in B&GH force me to
state explicitly that no silence on my part implies agreement that any proposition in
B&GI or B&GH is correct.
81. B&GII accuses me of "distort[ing]" their account, B&GII, supra note 1, at
341, but readers can judge for themselves whether B&GI describes an ALl misled by
its Reporters.
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of Sabbatino, but Judge Friendly and others outside the academy un-
derstood Sabbatino as endorsing the modern position. That is why the
core of the modem position was uncontroversial and why the debate
in the ALI focused on the details.
B. B&GII and Democracy
B&GII sheds further light on B&GI's argument based on democ-
racy. B&GI contains strongly worded claims that the modem position
conflicts with "fundamental constitutional principles"' and "basic no-
tions of American representative democracy."' s Although B&GI
never defined what it meant by democracy, I took these criticisms seri-
ously and attempted to explore whether the practice of presumptive
judicial incorporation of customary international law had lost its dem-
ocratic legitimacy. I also pointed out that if it had, then the same ob-
jection would apply to B&GIs proposal that, after Erie, it was the
State judges who had the power to incorporate customary interna-
tional law.
B&GII rejects this observation. It maintains that I am "incorrect"
to assert that the argument from democracy raises "the same prob-
lem" at the State and federal levels, because federal constitutional
separation of powers provisions do not govern state judiciaries.' It
then declines to analyze or to take a definite stance on the question
whether unelected State judges would be acting in a manner inconsis-
tent with basic notions of American representative democracy if they
applied customary international law rules as State common law with-
out prior authorization from the State legislature. It denies that con-
ducting this inquiry would yield any insight favorable to the modem
position.
Refusing to pursue the question will not enable B&GII to avoid the
dilemma inherent in its argument. If presumptive judicial incorpora-
tion of customary international law is inconsistent with basic notions
of American democracy in the normative sense, then that criticism
would seem to apply to unelected State judges as well as to federal
judges. State judges must have been behaving undemocratically
through all the years since 1776 when they were applying international
law, whether as "general common law" or as anything else. Thus,
Bradley and Goldsmith would be making a radical critique of Ameri-
can practice in the name of its own basic notions. If they had taken
the trouble to explore this obvious consequence of their argument, it
would have become clearer whether these "basic notions" involve de-
82. B&GI, supra note 1, at 817; id. at 873 ("some of our nation's most fundamen-
tal constitutional principles").
83. Id. at 857; id at 821 ("well-accepted notions of American representative de-
mocracy"); id. at 816 (abstract) ("basic understandings about American representa-
tive democracy").
84. B&GII, supra note 1, at 347 n.162.
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fensible principles actually held in the United States or a simplistic
and ahistorical conception of unqualified majoritarianism.
On the other hand, if State judicial incorporation of customary in-
ternational law is democratically legitimate because of "institutional
arrangements" 85 that can properly vary between the State and federal
levels, then we are really talking about the specific positive embodi-
ment of separation of powers at the federal level-in particular, the
scope of the enclave of federal common law that concerns foreign re-
lations. But to challenge the modem position on positive constitu-
tional grounds places a heavy burden on the challengers to overcome
the positive data that support the modern position. Presumptive in-
corporation of customary international law is within the understand-
ing of judicial power inherited from England and maintained since the
beginning of the Republic. It occurs within a field of overriding fed-
eral concern, justifying its continuation as post-Erie federal common
law. B&GI gives insufficient respect to federal supremacy in foreign
affairs and the twentieth century case law that reinforced it. Even
with regard to human rights law, B&GI does not sufficiently recognize
the need for uniformity.8 6
C. B&GII and the "Old" Customary International Law
B&GII makes explicit how thoroughly the analysis in B&GI ne-
glects the "old" customary international law in its crusade against the
judicial enforcement of human rights law. B&GII defends this
inattention:
[T]he enormous post-1980 literature on the domestic status of CIL
rarely if ever speaks to traditional CIL. It may still be possible for
an occasional issue of uncodified traditional CIL to arise in domes-
tic litigation. But these situations will be rare, however, and they
are not the focus of the modem position debate.87
Again:
Our position is that the judicial federalization of any CIL requires
some authorization from the Constitution or a federal statute. It is
important to keep in mind, however, that the authorization require-
ment has little if any practical significance in connection with tradi-
tional CIL. As explained above, the federal political branches
85. Id.
86. At the risk of repetition, I must point out the problem raised by their defense
of independent State activism in human rights. If State judges have the constitutional
authority to make independent and unreviewable determinations of what practices
violate customary international law, then they can enter holdings inconsistent with
national policy on that question. These will undermine federal efforts to maintain or
modify customary law, because decisions of domestic courts are important data in the
demonstration of customary norms. State decisions that, from a federal perspective,
rest on incorrectly identified customary human rights norms should be reviewable, as
well as State decisions that incorrectly deny the existence of customary norms.
87. B&GII, supra note 1, 326.
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appear to have incorporated into federal law most if not all of tradi-
tional CIL that is likely to come up in domestic litigation. The de-
bate about CIL's domestic status in the last three decades has
almost exclusively concerned new, rather than traditional, CIL. It is
significant that Neuman can cite only hypothetical and academic ex-
amples of the need for a federal common law of the traditional
CIL.88
In part II above, I offered consular immunity as an uncomplicated
example to illustrate the need for federal common law in domestic
litigation. As Professors Bradley and Goldsmith concede, U.S. acces-
sion to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations did not make
that Convention applicable to consuls in the United States from states
that are not parties to the Convention;89 it therefore did not make
customary immunity irrelevant in the United States. Nonetheless,
they dismiss the example as "hypothetical," because I cite no cases
involving suits against consuls from the nonparty states for actions
within the scope of their immunity.9 But the rarity of cases is scarcely
surprising, given the prevalence of the modern position. The impor-
tant inquiry is not what suits are being brought now, when they are
clearly futile, but what suits would be brought if the modern position
were overthrown as B&GI urges, and what a court would then do if
faced with such a case.
The fact that customary international law retains its relevance
within the United States despite U.S. accession to a multilateral con-
vention illustrates a point that readers of B&GI might well have
missed. B&GI's overriding focus on human rights law obscures the
very different way that adoption of customary law by treaty works in
other fields. In human rights treaties, states usually promise each
other to respect certain rights of persons irrespective of nationality. It
is therefore possible to speak of the treaty as incorporating a custom-
ary norm into federal law, without specifying the class of beneficiaries.
In other treaties, states usually make reciprocal promises for the bene-
fit of each other, without conferring any benefit on third-party states
and their nationals. In that case, the treaty would not incorporate the
customary norm as such, but only incorporate it vis--A-vis treaty part-
ners. If B&GI had not neglected the "old" customary law, its analysis
would have been required to grapple with this distinction and the gaps
that it causes.
If consular immunity is a simple but limited example, a more con-
troversial and complicated example has figured prominently in the
literature. That is the problem of customary international law limits
on the exercise of extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction. Professor
Trimble devoted ten pages to it in his 1986 critique of the modem
88. Id. at 354.
89. See id. at 342.
90. See id. at 354-55.
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position,91 and Professor Brilmayer discussed it at some length as well
in an article that B&GI cites frequently.' B&GI mentions this issue
in passing, 93 but provides no analysis of the situation of a federal court
asked to apply State law extraterritorially in a case where customary
international law forbids such application. There is, of course, no U.S.
treaty or statute governing the general subject of State extraterritorial
regulation.
B&GII dismisses the extraterritoriality example as "hypothetical
and academic." 94 Once more, rather than trying to understand the
implications of the example, they belittle it, and they quarrel with the
substantive rule.95
B&GI and B&GH evidence no effort to investigate what the conse-
quences of their proposal would be for the "old" customary interna-
tional law. Bradley and Goldsmith have simply made the
unsupported assertion that "most if not all" of that law has been in-
corporated in treaties and statutes,96 and waited to snipe at counterex-
amples. That assertion is no substitute for informed analysis. The
distinction between most and all is crucial in this context. In addition
to their other major errors, they give no serious attention to this dif-
ference before urging the abandonment of the 200-year-old practice of
judicially incorporating customary international law.
91. Trimble, supra note 2, at 696-707.
92. Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of Inter-
national Law, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 295, 318-21, 339-40 (1995).
93. B&GI, supra note 1, at 847.
94. B&GII, supra note 1, at 354.
95. See id. at 354-55.
96. Id. at 354.
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